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Abstract: Civil-military relations are vital to the coherence and effectiveness of post-conflict peacebuilding, but have often 
been problematic. This article argues that civil-military issues vary systematically in relation to the particular civil and mili-
tary actors in peacebuilding, and that the coercive content of the external military's mission creates special challenges in 
each of these sets of relationships. Given the Significance of the military footprint, the article presents trade-offs for policy-
makers intending to use military forces to make peace. 
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I n traditional UN peacekeeping missions deployed during the Cold War, military forces supervised and monitored cease fires between states, usually in the wake of a peace 
agreement and authorized under Chapter VI of the UN char-
ter. At about the same time that the Cold War ended and 
great powers were more inclined to work together in the Se-
curity Council, the UN shifted focus to respond to the 
pressing need for a more comprehensive and sometimes co-
ercive response to internal conflict. Peacebuilding, introduced 
in 1992 by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
sought not merely to keep apart conflicting factions but to 
build structures that would sustain peace. l As compared to 
previous peacekeeping efforts, peacebuilding would require 
greater synergy across spheres of assistance - social, eco-
nomic, humanitarian, security, and political-administrative 
- and among an increasing variety of agencies and actors fa-
cilitating transitions to peace. At the turn of the century, an 
emergent international consensus on coherence - the coordi-
nation of intervention and humanitarian actions - ma-
tured. 2 At this same moment, military interventions by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo, US-
led coalition forces in Afghanistan, and a US- and British-led 
coalition in Iraq, created deep divisions about the rightful-
ness of intervention, the balance between civilian and mili-
tary components within it, and the governance of what 
would follow. 
Civil-military synergy is particularly vital to managing post-
conflict transitions, but has too often been problematic.3 
Civil and military actors, both within various troop-
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contributing states and in the multilateral arena, have 
waged fundamental contests over the determination of mili-
tary mandates, specific military roles, training requirements, 
troop diScipline, resource allocations, and multilateral 
command and control structures. What makes civil-military 
tensions more likely, and more harmful? First, tensions and 
rivalries differ systematically in relation to the particular 
civil and military actors in peacebuilding - in some measure 
a function of the division of roles among civil and military 
actors. Second, civil-military tensions are affected by the 
level/potential for violence in the post-conflict environ-
ment, particularly in relation to the coercive content of the 
external military's mission. 
The first section of this article describes those military roles 
in peacebuilding, which make civil-military relations so vital 
to success. The second section discusses specific issues in 
milltary relations with three sets of Civilians: command 
authOrities, civilian agencies, and civilian populations. Mili-
tary relationships with these three civilian groups arise in 
the context of the military footprint - the scope of military 
involvement in implementation. Military mandates that in-
volve providing public security, disarmament and seizure of 
persons indicted for war crimes are more dangerous and im-
ply larger military presence and intrusiveness in the war-
torn society. The final section of this article illuminates 
trade-ofts in policy decisions about the military footprint in 
peacebuiIding. 
1. Military roles in peacebuilding 
The remark, attributed to former United Nations Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjold, that "peacekeeping is not a job 
for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,,, depicts the military 
role as a necessary evil! Soldiers might agree, particularly if 
peacekeeping breaks with their long-standing conceptions of 
military purpose. Although the rules have changed, there is 
at least one consistent norm in United Nations peacekeep-
ing: the use of force to defeat a belligerent is prohibited.s For 
4 Quoted In Margaret Daly Hayes, .Political-Mllitary Relations Within In-
ternational Organlzatlons-, report of the symposium at the Inter-
American Defense Collcgc, 28 September 1995, Fort McNair, Washington, 
D.C., 1995, p. 7. 
5 John Gerard Ruggie, »The UN and the Collective Use of Force: Whither or 
Whether? In Michael Pugh, ed., The UN, Peace and Force, London: Frank 
Cass, 1997, p. 11. 
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military forces, this means that in peacebuilding the center 
of gravity is commonly located in the civilian domain. 
Barred from war making, peacekeeping forces are all the 
more servants of civilian implementers engaged in peace-
building. 
Peacekeeping traditionally required impartial, lightly armed 
military personnel to monitor and observe the implementa-
tion of peace agreements between conflicting states. The 
military personnel who donned the blue berets of United 
Nations peacekeepers were generally from developed na-
tions, but not major powers. As the Cold War ended in 
1989-92, great powers got into the game, multilateral ar-
rangements became more complex, missions became more 
coercive, and occurred within states. 
Military arrangements became more diffuse. In Bosnia, great 
and major powers such as the United States, Britain, France 
and Germany acted through NATO and with UN pre-
authorization, and in Kosovo with UN post-facto legitimiza-
tion. NATO Secretary-General ]aap de Hoop Scheffer has 
also mentioned the possibility of a peacekeeping role in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.6 In Afghanistan and Iraq, the US 
formed its own coalitions and the UN wrestled with the 
challenges of coherence. Meanwhile, frustrated by great 
power reluctance to engage national or UN forces in Africa, 
West African nations have established their own missions 
under regional frameworks, including most recently a 2003 
resolution by the African Union (AU) to approve the African 
Mission in Burundi.7 Similarly, Indonesia recently proposed 
the establishment of an Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) Peacekeeping Force by 2012.8 
The roles for external military persolUlel vary widely. Foreign 
military leaders sometimes participate in negotiating cease 
fires or even peace settlements of civil wars, as was done in 
Mozambique, Angola and Bosnia.9 Military contributors per-
form or monitor military-oriented tasks such as demobiliza-
tion, encampment and disarmament of parties. Enforcement 
of no-fly zones or cease-fires, for example, exercises external 
coercion. However, it might be sufficient to simply promote 
transparency among warring parties. In that event, external 
forces monitor cease-fires, disarmament, and demobilization. 
Securing relief convoys, as in Somalia, or ballot booths, as in 
Cambodia, requires passive coercion. External militaries 
might also play very non-coercive roles in support of civilian 
agencies, by lending craft to transport relief supplies, estab-
lishing camps for displaced people, and providing engineer-
ing and other expertise for reconstruction. 
6 Jaap van Wesel, -NATO Chief Sees His Troops In West Bank and Gaza 
Peacekeeping Role., The Jerusalem Report, 3 November 2003. 
7 Africa Recovery, .Pan-Africa: Africa Builds Its Own Peace Forces-, Africa 
NfflS, 23 October 2003. African peacekeeping was conducted under the 
framework of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) In Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'ivolre; under the 
auspices of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central AfrIcan 
States (CEMAC) in the Central AfrIcan Republic; and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) in Lesotho and (rather more problem. 
atlc) the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa was meanwhile engaged 
in mediation among factions in Sudan and Somalia. 
8 -UN Terms ASEAN Peacekeeping Force Idea 'Very Exciting'., Japan Eco-
nomic Nfflswlre, 24 February 2004. 
9 Anthony D. Marley, -Responsibilities of a Military Negotiator DUring 
Peace Talks-, Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 67· 78. 
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Given expanded roles in modern peacekeeping, military 
contributors can expect to deal with more complexity in 
their relationships. Multiple levels of civilian authority, ac-
tive civilian management of peace processes, large numbers 
of civilian agencies active in theater, and scrutiny over 
compliance with norms of civilian protection increase the 
number and character of relationships. In short, this use of 
force makes for interesting and controversial civil-military 
relations. 
2. Civil-military relationships 
Civilian control of military force and military control of op-
erations are fundamental issues in civil-military relations. 
Numerous sub-issues arise during attempts to improve ci-
vilian control and military effectiveness, including military 
profeSSionalism, separation of military and civilian spheres, 
determination of roles and missions, contests over resources, 
and the mobilization of interest groups. These issues, long 
recognized as Significant in domestic civil-military relations, 
also play out in the international context of peace imple-
mentation. 
When discussing civil-military relations in international 
peacebuilding, it is critical to ask which civil-military rela-
tions one is considering. As the following table shows, these 
issues are relevant in military relations with different sets of 
civilians. In addition to command relationships, two other 
sets of civil-military relations are at play in peacebuilding: 
external military relations with civilian agencies and their 
relations with civilian populations. 
2.1 Civil-military issues by categories of civilians 
Category of Political Leader- Partidpatlng Ci- Civilian Popula-
Civilian: ship viUan Agencies tion 
Nature of Authoritative Coordlnative Subordinate 
Relation-
ship: 
Primary Strategic Operational Tactical 
Level of 
Analysis: 
Potential Civilian control cut tural differ- Military profes-
Civil- - or Institutional ences - or ability sionallsm - or 
military Is- equilibrium In to get along good conduct 
sues: call1ng the shots with dvilian 
or getting in- agendes 
volved 
2.2 Relations with civilian command authorities 
Military relations with their command authorities are inten-
tionally hierarchical. Domestic civil-military relations are 
Significant, even in multinational missions, which have two 
tiers of authority. Command, as generally understood, in-
cludes not simply authority over personnel matters like 
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promotions, but also the ability to change missions. 1o Na-
tional governments retain command authority over military 
forces, even if operational authority is transferred, for ex-
ample, to the United Nations. 
The UN does not have the ability to exercise full command. 
The United Nations term »operational authority« is to a cer-
tain degree a combination of the elements of NATO's opera-
tional command and operational control: 
"United Nations operational authority entails the exclusive 
authority to issue operational directives within the limits of 
1) a spedfic mandate of the Security Council, 2) a spedfic 
geographic area (the mission area as a whole), and 3) an 
agreed period of time. Operational authority includes the 
authority to assign separate tasks to sub-units of a contingent 
and general responsibility for logistic support. ell 
The degree of operational authority granted to the UN by 
troop contributing states is a political decision to be deter-
mined by the national authorities. 
Political control, if not civilian control, is needed to commit 
troops to peacekeeping. However, although peacebuilding 
generally promotes the norm of civilian control, in the past 
Nigerian peacekeepers were not, and today Pakistani peace-
keepers are not, governed by civilians. Moreover, today's 
United Nations peacekeeping missions are manned primar-
ily by developing nationsY Militaries that acqUire much-
needed funding, training, and eqUipment from participation 
in UN peacekeeping, would seem less likely to balk at de-
ployments than wealthier armed forces that see peacekeep-
ing as »auxiliary.« 
It is no coincidence that United States military leaders, who 
generally do not see peacebuilding as a primary mission, 
have challenged civilian leadership before and during mis-
sions. American civilian and military leaders were bitterly 
divided over the Bosnia strategy. Diplomat Richard Hol-
brooke, who negotiated a peace accord for the warring Bos-
nian factions at Dayton, Ohio, and Leighton Smith, the 
military man implementing the agreement, argued with 
each other publicly, including public complaints by Hol-
brooke about the poor quality of military advice.13 The level 
of civilian expertise and the role of military advice affect the 
authoritative relationship of civilian command over soldiers 
in peace operations. 
A more challenging issue of command and control arises 
from the nature of the use of force in peacebuilding. In war, 
10 To add to the confusion, NATO doctrine, for example, distinguishes be-
tween operational control and operational command. See joint Publica-
tion 1-02, .000 DIctionary of Milltary and Associated Terms. As 
amended through 09 January 2003 .• Available online at http://www.dtlc. 
mll/doctrineffel/doddict{natoterm/of 
11 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, General Guide-
lines for Peace·keeping Operations, UN/210{TC/GG9S, New York, October 
1995, p. 36. 
12 In February 2004 the top ten ranking contributors were Pakistan, Bangla-
desh (over 6,000 troops), Nigeria (more than 3,500), India, Nepal, and 
Ghana (over 2,000), Uruguay, jordan, Kenya and South Africa (over 
1,400). United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
.Monthly Summary of Military and CIvilian Pollee Contributions to UN 
Operatlons-, 29 February 2004. Available online at http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/dpko/contrlbutors/index.htm. 
13 Michael Kirk and Rick Young (producers and writers), Peter J. Boyer (cor-
respondent), .Glve War a Chance,. Frontline Program In7lS. Aired on 
PBS 11 May 1999. Holbrooke was also doubtful that the US military 
would make a sincere effort to capture indicted war criminals in Bosnla. 
military commanders tend to prefer freedom of action, or 
operational contro1.14 Peace operations lend themselves to 
civilian micro-management of the use of force. One at-
tempted solution is to distinguish carefully between civilian 
and military mandates. US military leaders lobbied for and 
got a firewall between milltary and civilian tasks into the 
Dayton Accord for Bosnia. Thanks to this compartmentali-
zation, some perversely portray the implementation of the 
Dayton Accord as a military success and civilian failure. ls 
Multilateral operations add complexity. NATO itself was di-
vided over Bosnia during the UNPROFOR era. European na-
tions, with large numbers of troops on the ground under 
UNPROFOR, were wary of the American Congress's proposal 
to lift an arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims (or 
Bosniaks), and to strike at Serbia - dubbed »lift and strike.« 
FUrthermore, the two major intergovernmental organiza-
tions (IGOs) engaged, the UN and NATO, were »deeply and 
publicly at odds" over the proper military response to the 
situation in Bosnia in 1994,16 A »dual key" arrangement 
provided for UN approval of military action by NATO. This 
command system was an issue during a May 1995 crisis in 
which the UN Bosnia Force Commander, British General 
Rupert Smith, called for air strikes against the Serbs, who 
were shelling civilians in designated »safe areas.« The re-
quest went all the way to the Secretary-General, who turned 
it down. From a military perspective, the command ar-
rangements were not only untidy, they were unsafe. Not 
surprisingly, the dual key arrangement was changed in July, 
in the wake of the massacre of an estimated 7,414 Muslims 
at Srebrenica. 17 Interestingly, after this change, the ,.keys« 
for air strike launch were held by all military men: General 
Bernard Janvier, overall commander of UN forces (rather 
than with the UN Special Representative Yasushi Akashi), 
and Admiral Leighton Smith, NATO's Southern Region 
commander. External involvement afterward entered a new 
phase marked by the creation of a larger force and authori-
zation of massive air attacks. 
The commander of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) complained 
that he had "nothing to command.«18 Many of his proposals 
to military leaders of the national military contingents were 
referred back to governments for approval. Major power 
14 Max Manwaring takes the notion from Clausewltz that the goal of policy 
Is the • [djestructlon of an opponent's military forces or the means for 
waging ware, to mean that .It Is the military that dominates to create 
conditions that other means could not make .• Max G. Manwaring, .Um-
!ted War and Conflict Control,. in Stephen J. Clmbala and Keith A. 
Dunn, eds., Conflict Tennination and Mi/ftQry Strategy: Coerdon, Persuasion, 
and War, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987, p. 60. Italics added. 
15 George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, Civilian-Mi/itQry Coop-
eration in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements In Bos-
nia and Beyond, New York: Carnegie Corporation, December 1998. The 
authors commend the US military mission In Rwanda as a success, al-
though the US military did not Intervene to stop the genocide, because 
US commanders avoided .mlsslon creepe. 
16 Wlillam H. LewIs and Edward Marks, .Searching for Partners: Regional 
Organizations and Peace Operatlons_, Mc.'l/alr Paper 58, Washington, DC: 
INSS-NDU, June 1998. 
17 William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil, New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2000, pp. 146-192. 
18 Independent International Comrn1sslon on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 107. See also James Fergusson, A 
Mile Wide and an Inch Deep: Multilateralism and the Command and Control 
of Multinational MilitQry Forces In Peace Operations. York University Centre 
for International and Security Studies Working Paper No.8, june 1998, p. 
2. 
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militaries, as in Bosnia and Somalia for example, generally 
took orders from their own governments. 
Meanwhile, national preferences also translate into lobbying 
for appointments of military leaders to international 
peacekeeping missions. France lobbied for a French force 
commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1993, and the 
Swedish commander was changed for a French general. Un-
diplomatically, the French defense minister announced the 
change on French television before UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali notified the Swedish government. 19 
Coalitions reqUire consent and compromise, principles that 
seemingly conflict with reqUirements for military effective-
ness.20 Lt. General Michael Short, the American who di-
rected the NATO bombing campaign during the 78-day war 
against Serbia over Kosovo, alleged that coalition politics 
caused strategy to suffer and pilots to be at risk. The Ameri-
can contribution to the air campaign was by far the largest, 
but the decision-making was multinational and even micro-
managerial: "Targeting was a problem to uS,« Short said, " ... 
and as you know, the red card was played by France in par-
ticular [to veto selected targets].«21 
In sum, coercive peacekeeping stresses the relationship be-
tween military leaders and civilian masters. Just when a 
mandate permits the use of force, national governments are 
more likely to put limits on its use in support of policy 
goals, watering down strategies to a lowest common de-
nominator. Just when military might is most needed to cre-
ate peace, missions are hampered by convoluted command 
and control structures, national troop withdrawals, or reluc-
tance by political or military leaders to commit to opera-
tions in the first place. 
2.3 Cooperative relations with civilian partners 
"Unity of command« is vital to operational effectiveness in 
war. The analogous concept in peace operations, »unityof 
effort« (or "coherence«) with civilian agencies, is also in-
tended to achieve desired outcomes more quickly. This no-
tion of unity implies shared civil-military objectives; how-
ever, civilian and military agendas may differ. 
Expanded Civilian non-governmental and intergovernmen-
tal participation in peace processes after World War II cre-
ated a new set of civil-military considerations at the opera-
tionallevel. In contrast to previous history, civilian agencies 
are typically on the scene before the military arrives. 
International military forces and civilian humanitarian or-
ganizations have been depicted as ,.two natural partners, 
who had long been intended for one another but had never 
19 William Shawcross, Dtliver Us From Evil, New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2000. p. 112. 
20 Nora Bensahel •• The Coalition Paradox: The Politics of Milltary Coopera-
tion". Ph.D. Dissertation Stanford University, August 1999. p. 29. 
21 Lt. Gen. Michael Short to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, 
quoted In SBC News •• US General Condemns French 'Red card'., 22 <K-
tober 1999. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hl/world/ 
4820tS.stm. See also »Interview with Lt. Gen. Michael Short." PBS Front-
line, War in Europe PBS Online, and WGBHlFrontlinc Sltc, produced feb-
ruary 2000. Available online: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows!kosovo/intervlews/short.html. 
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actually met during the Cold War.«22 However, the relation-
ship might be better described as a »marriage of conven-
ience.,,21 NGOs and IGOs operating in a hostile environ-
ment need the military for security and logistics, and 
military forces need these civilians to take over humanitar-
ian relief and enable them to leave. The participants often 
enter with incompatible expectations and in part acrimoni-
ously. 
Cultural differences between hierarchical military forces and 
decentralized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
abound. During the United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission (UNAVEM), lack of professional respect between 
peacekeepers and humanitarian workers hampered demin-
ing and demobilization efforts.24 Time horizons differ. Ci-
vilian actors tend to operate for longer periods in the field, 
so that civil-military relationships are recreated to some ex-
tent with each rotation. While many civilian agencies look 
at long-term development needs for war-tom societies, mili-
tary personnel are more likely to focus on achieving their 
objectives in a specific mission. 
NGOs are non-governmental, but not necessarily neutral, 
actors. Those that focus on human rights monitoring and 
advocacy are "far from neutral," says Pamela Aall, adopting 
»princlpled and often adversarial positions with regard to 
both official institutions and the parties engaged in a con-
flict.«2S On the other hand, relief, economic development or 
conflict resolution organizations tend to be impartial, some-
times more so than military forces. 
Coercive interventions force aid organizations to make diffi-
cult choices between seeking the protection of peacekeeping 
forces and maintaining distance from them, thereby giving 
the impression of impartiality. In Somalia in 1992, prior to 
the arrival of the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF), some 
relief agencies hired protection from armed 10cals.26 This 
created difficulties when UNITAF sought to demilitarize the 
environment. Ten years later, civil-military relations were 
worse in Afghanistan. NGOs protested against United States 
military actions, which concurrently delivered aid and 
bombs. Sally Austin of CARE International complained 
about American Special Forces: »They are here in civilian 
clothes, saying they are doing humanitarian work. But they 
are putting our own efforts as humanitarians at risk.«27 
22 Hugo SUm. -The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil-Military Relations in Peace 
Support Operations." International Peacekeeping. Vol. 3. No.4, 1997. p. 
129. 
23 Andrew S. Natslos, .NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian 
Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation? in 'Thomas G. Weiss and Leon 
Gordenker, eds., NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, Boulder and Lon-
don: Lynne Rlenner, 1996, p. 81-
24 Nicole Ball and Kathleen campbell. Complu Crisis and Peace: Humanitar-
Ian Coordination in Angola. prepared for the United Nations Office of Hu-
manitarian Affairs (OCHA), New York: United Nations, March 1998. pp. 
38-39. 
25 Pamela R. Aall, .NGOs and Conflict Management,. Peauworks, No.5, 
Washington. DC: United States Institute of Peace. February 1996, p. 5. 
26 Charles Rogers •• The Changing Shape of Security for NGO Field Work-
ers., Together Magazine, No. 57. January-Match 1998, aVailable via World-
Vision's website: http://www.worldvlsion .org/worldvlslon/pr.nsf/ 
stable{NGOsecuritya. Former US Ambassador to Somalia. Robert Oakley. 
discusses the problem in .An Envoy's Perspective., Joint Forces Quarterly, 
Autumn 1993, pp. 44·55. 
27 Susan Glasser, .Soldlers in Civilian Clothing; U.S. Forces' Humanitarian 
Effort In Afghanistan Draws Ire of Aid Agencies •• Washington Post, March 
28. 2002. p. AZO. 
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Finally, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) confronted the reality of belligerency in the 
US- and British-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. OCHA's »Gen-
eral Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Per-
sonnel and Military Actors in the Context of the Crisis in 
Iraq« emphasized operational independence of UN person-
nel and regarded coalition forces as belligerent occupants.28 
This was an astonishing break with the trend toward a more 
integrated approach to post-conflict security-building. Mer 
decades of humanitarian intervention, belligerents and hu-
manitarian actors were clearly identified. 
2.4 Relations with civilian populations 
When missions are coercive, military interactions with ci-
vilian populations are also more intense. This was obvious 
in Cambodia, where the large external military presence had 
a tremendous impact on the economy and sociallife.29 This 
is more obvious still in Iraq today, where the environment 
has been too unstable for a United Nations mission to be 
considered. The coalition that waged war in 2003 struggled 
in 2004 to stabilize an environment in which the Red Cross 
and the UN itself have been attacked. »Everyone's a target 
now,« said a security consultant in Baghdad in April 2004, 
,.They won't stop and ask if you work for an NGO ... the CPA, 
or a security company .. .It's a guerrilla war. They don't care 
who they get. ,,30 
The requirements of peacekeeping are sometimes compared 
to those of counterinsurgency operations in which the ci-
vilian population is the center of gravity of military opera-
tions. In internal conflicts, leaders of factions depend on 
their relations with the population for their ability to defend 
or attack, and without whom they could not maintain their 
position, sustain access to spoils of war, and avoid prosecu-
tions, such as for war crimes.3! The relationship between ex-
ternal military forces and the civilian population is a signifi-
cant strategic consideration. 
Military professionalism is vital when troops operate in 
heavily populated environments. Unfortunately, some 
troops are more professional than others. The commission 
of crimes by peacekeepers themselves can undermine public 
support for the mission. The types of misconduct alleged to 
have been committed by multinational peacekeeping troops 
include torture, rape, murder, black marketeering, racket-
eering, and child prostitution.32 Some Bulgarian troops sta-
tioned with UNTAC in Cambodia were characterized as, 
.. more interested in organizing prostitution rings than in 
28 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, .General Guid· 
ance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military Ac-
tors in the Context of the Crisis in Iraq,_ 21 March 2003. Available online 
via RelielWeb: http://www.reliefweb.int. 
29 When attacking UNTAC forces, the Khmer Rouge claimed to be protect-
ing women and children from an occupation army. 
30 Bay Fang, Kevin Whitelaw and nana Ozernoy, .Hell's Fury,_ US News and 
World Report, Vol. 135, No. 12, 12 April 2004, p. 16. 
31 Par Eriksson, .Civil-Milltary Co-ordination In Peace Support Operations -
An Impossible Necesslty?« The Journal of Humanitarian ASsistance, posted 
16 September 2000 on http://www.jha.ac/artlcles/a061.htm. 
32 .Keeplng the Peace?« Dateline NBC. Program aired 10 January 1999. l.ea 
Thompson reporting, Mark Feldstlen producing. UN officials Interviewed 
for this program conceded that the DPKO has not kept statistics on crimes 
comrnl tted by I ts peacekeeping troops. 
monitoring cease-fire violations.«33 Peacekeepers have been 
implicated as patrons in the industry of sex slavery in the 
Balkans. In 2002, the Head of the UN Office for Human 
Rights in Bosnia, Madeleine Rees, said, »[t]here is absolutely 
no dispute that the sex traffic market [in the Balkans] came 
with the arrival of the peacekeepers.«34 
Civilian police officers are generally preferred for civil order 
tasks, precisely because they have more experience operat-
ing in civilian environments.3s Ironically, the focus of inves-
tigations into allegations of patronizing and even partici-
pating in the Balkans sex trade is on civilian police. A senior 
official conceded that military peacekeepers are generally 
easier to discipline than civilian participants, as military or-
ganizations train and rigorously police their own members. 
Some militaries, particularly NATO members and the armed 
forces of wealthier nations, receive better training than oth-
ers. The behavior of American troops therefore ought to be 
exemplary. Even so, a US Army investigation into the abuse 
of Kosovar Albanian civilians by a US Army Unit on 
peacekeeping duty identified a lack of proper training for 
missions that required soldiers to temper »their combat 
mentality. «36 
High quality training and standards for conduct are clearly 
needed, with emphasis on military professionalism and dis-
cipline.37 The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) has reacted to shortcomings in training with the 
creation of the Training and Evaluation Service (TES), which 
develops and provides standardized peacekeeping training 
guidance. 
International organizations such as the UN do not have the 
same leverage over misbehaving peacekeepers as do civilian 
officials at home, since soldiers are generally immune from 
prosecution except by their own governments.38 Problems in 
the field can lead to civil-military tensions back home. A 
cover-up at the senior officer level during the inquiry into 
the murder of a Somali youth in 1993 by Canadian peace-
keepers provoked a civil-military relations crisis in Canada 
33 William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil, New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2000, p. SO. 
34 It is estimated that In 2000 the sex trade Involved 200,ODO southeastern 
European women - and an Increasing number in the age group of IS-IS. 
.Sins of the Peacekeepers,_ Sunday Herald (london) 30 June 2002, 
http://www.sundayherald.com. See also Barbara Crossette, .Peacekeep-
lng's Unsavory Slde,- UN Wire, 11 June 2003. 
35 Kathryn Bolkovac, a human rights investigator, has sued DynCorp in 
London, the contractor for United Nations Civilian Police, charging un-
fair dismissal after she sent e-mail messages to the UN Mission about UN 
police officers and humanitarian workers exploiting women forced Into 
prostitution. Steward Payne, • Teenagers 'used for sex by UN In Bosnia,'. 
The Daily Telegraph (London), 25 April 2002, p. 17. 
36 Associated Press, .US Kosovo Report Shows Mlsconduct,- The Nt!W York 
TImes, 18 September 2000, Available online at http://www.nytlmes.com. 
37 Thomas S. Szayna, Preston Niblack and William O'Malley, .Assesslng 
Armed Forces Deficiencies for Peace Operations: A Methodology,- Interna-
lional Peacekeeping, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 77-91. The Brahimi 
Panel in August 2000 notes that, although member states are primarlly.re-
sponsible for peacekeeping training, the United Nations ought to proVlde 
guidelines and perfonnance standards. See the Srahlmi Panel's Report 
A/SS/305-S/2000/S09, 21 August 2000, General Assembly Resolutions 
46/48, 4S/42, 49/37, and the Secretary-General's Report NSS/502, 20 Oc-
tober 2000. 
38 An Italian commission conducted an inquiry that exonerated two Italian 
generals who resigned over the scandal In June 1997 .• Italian Anny 
Cleared of Widespread Abuse In Somalia-, CNN World News, 9 August 
1997. URL: http://cnn.comIWORlD/9708/09/ltaly.somalla.index.html. 
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as an entire regiment was dissolved.39 The International 
Criminal Court is a forum for prosecution of alleged crimes 
during missions that have to date been confined to national 
military tribunals. This very issue is part of the US rationale 
for refusing to participate in the court. 
3. Trade-offs in intervention strategy 
Intervention strategies include choices about the relative 
weight - in roles, resources and composition - of civilian 
and military components of the peace mission. These 
choices affect civil-military relationships. In observer or tra-
ditional peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, often 
involving fewer than 1,000 troops, there was no basis for 
military components to challenge, and little opportunity for 
them to thwart, the dominance of diplomatic components. 
Coercive strategies reqUire more military forces. These 
commitments involve more risk, more expense, and more 
likely civilian micromanagement of military operations. In 
sum, coercive strategies exacerbate tensions in each of the 
civil-military relationship sets. 
In multinational missions, coercive actions are more prob-
lematic because of variations in doctrinal approaches to 
peacekeeping. The approach of United States civil-military 
operations (CMO) doctrine, incorporating principles of war, 
for example, contrasts markedly with the emphasis in other 
civil-military cooperation or CIMIC doctrines. 
General agreement on the principles of traditional UN 
peacekeeping does not translate to agreement in modern 
peace enforcement. The United Nations Secretariat offers 
guidelines rather than doctrine as such. Of the various re-
gional organizations, NATO has made more progress than 
most toward a comprehensive CIMIC doctrine, although the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
and others are actively engaged in capturing the lessons of 
their peacekeeping experiences.40 NATO CIMIC doctrine ac-
knowledges the possibility of coercive intervention, while 
respecting the requirements of coordination and coopera-
tion of civil and military actors in support of the mission. 
Just as we must ask which civilians form the civil-military re-
lationship, it also matters which military forces are involved. 
Some militaries bring international political baggage. Ac-
cepting troop contributors from interested regional actors or 
major powers may increase the odds of military effectiveness 
at the expense of political impartiality. Secondly, militaries 
have different orientations toward society. Some have been 
segregated from SOCiety and oriented toward defense against 
uniformed adversaries on a defined battlefield, as was the US 
39 See the five volumes by the Canadian Commission of Inquiry Into the 
Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Les-
sons of the Somalia Affair, Toronto: Canadian Government Publishing, 
1997. 
40 The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century 
- Concluding Report 1970-2002, Stockholm, Sweden: Elanders Gotab. 
2002, pp. 89-109. Also available online at http://www.peacebuil-
dingchallenges.net. See also Mark Malan, -Towards an Integrated Doc-
trine for Peace Support Operations In Africa«; Monograph 46, Building 
Stability In Africa: Challenges for the N(W Millennium, February 2000, avail-
able online at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/N046/To-
wards.htmI. 
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military during the Cold War. Other militaries have more 
recent and extensive experience with counter insurgencies 
or other internal control functions. 
When member states consider participation in a peace-
keeping mission, two criteria for that participation are na-
tional interest and estimations of likely success. Canadian 
General Romeo Dallaire, whose life changed forever ten 
years ago when, as UN Force Commander, he was unable to 
stop the Rwandan genocide, regrets the role of national in-
terest. "Who do I blame?« he asks, ,,1 blame the lack of 
statesmanship. 1 blame the Americans - leadership, which 
includes the pentagon in projecting itself as world police-
man one day and recluse the next ... President Clinton say-
ing ... that the Americans will go in only if it's in their self-
interest. «41 External national motivation to contribute 
troops to peace implementation brings disadvantages as well 
as advantages. National interest ensures a sense of purpose 
and support from the public at home. UN missions have 
been generally successful at containing conflict, even if they 
have fared poorly overall at resolving it.42 However, this evi-
dence suggests that UN missions are really an extension of 
great power management. When national interest is obvi-
ous, humanitarian operations may appear as rehearsals for 
armies of the developed countries to rapidly project power 
into the developing world.43 Meanwhile, UN military forces 
seek to be perceived as impartial in the field. 
Estimations of success provide further criteria, based on 
power balances among belligerents, the quality of a settle-
ment, and indigenous resources for reconstruction. An ap-
proach that picks implementation based on its likely success 
minimizes the risk that failures in peace implementation 
will erode its legitimacy and the morale of multilateral par-
ticipants. As a disadvantage, this approach may cause the in-
ternational community to abandon some of the peoples 
that are in greatest need of assistance, and leave them to 
their own devices as human rights abuses, genocide, and the 
ravages of war continue. 
Choices about organizational structures - how multilateral 
and how military - were controversial in the recent occupa-
tion of Iraq. Nationalization of peace implementation, as de-
fined by an emphasis on the leadership of contributing 
states, helps to overcome the reluctance of its soldiers to 
serve under foreign offidals and streamlines policy channels 
compared to highly complex multilateral operations. On the 
other hand, choosing multilateralization potentially pools 
resources and provides a better sense of impartiality that 
may be necessary to the maintenance of consent of the par-
ties to the conflict. The dvil-military mix itself also matters. 
The use of military forces for peace implementation accus-
41 Romeo Dallaire interview with Peter Mansbridge, The National Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 24 October 2003. 
42 Duane Bratt, .Assesslng the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations«, in 
Michael Pugh, ed., The UN, Peace and Force, London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 
64-81. 
43 N. Stockton, -An NGO Perspective on Civil Reconstruction«, paper pre-
sented at the Refugee Studies Programme Conference on the Role of the 
Military in Humanitarian Emergencies, Oxford University, October 1995, 
cited In Hugo Slim, -The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil-Military Relations 
in Peace Support Operations«; International Peacekeeping, Vol. 3, No.4, 
1997, pp. 123-140. 
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toms transitional societies to military operations in the civil 
realm, and thus undermines the process of democratiza-
tion"· Alternatively, external military forces might spread 
the norms of good civil-military relations if they are aware 
of the weight of their example and know how to conduct 
themselves appropriately.45 This article has shown the 
emerging context in which that assumption plays out, and 
some of the challenges to such leadership by example. 
4. Conclusion 
When we distinguish among types of missions and identify 
the types of civil-military relationShips that are relevant in 
44 For the argument that external military Involvement Increases military 
operations of local armies and undermines democratization, see Joy 01· 
son and Preston Pen tony, US Military HI/manltarian and Civil Assistance 
Programs and Their Application in Central America, Albuquerque, New 
Mexico: interhemispheric Resource Center, 1995. 
45 The latter view has been an underlying asswnptlon in United States civic 
action programs. See various chapters In John W. de Pauwand George A. 
Luz, eds., Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Ac· 
tion, New York: Praeger, 1992. 
peacebuilding, it is clear that the character of the mission 
and the mix of civil-military organizational components re-
quire better conception in both planning and execution. 
Command and control arrangements of multilateral peace-
building forces are significant to both civil-military relations 
and the prospects of peace. However, more nuanced divi-
sion of labor issues arise. The division of labor among civil-
ian and military institutions of contributing states must be 
resolved by interagency agreement and the determination of 
a »lead agency.« The division of labor between civilian and 
military institutions at the international level involves not 
only determining roles of multilateral militaries, but also 
those of civilians of international and non-governmental 
organizations. Finally, societies attempting to rebuild after 
war will be making their own decisions about the division of 
labor between civilian and military institutions as they 
transform their own security sector. It is imperative that, as 
external implementers seek to provide war-tom societies 
space to make such transformations, they do so with care to 
the example they set in the process. 
The civil-military interface with local populations: 
Impact on peacebuilding strategies 
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Abstract: Multinational troops are increasingly deployed to internal wars characterized by multi ethnic violence, paramili-
tary regimes and autocratic state leadership. Their closeness to the local populations presents interesting implications for 
contemporary peacekeeping training programs and the further development of military doctrine in warfighting, peace en-
forcement and peacekeepirlg environments. In most cases, regional paramilitary forces and warlords garner local support by 
convincing indigenous populations that their allegiance will be rewarded with the provision of individual security and pro-
tection. The success of the multinational forces in redirecting this allegiance depends largely on how the force is perceived 
as a credible security provider. For this reason, a careful balance must be preserved between maintaining a »robust posture« 
and interfadng within the local population to strengthen confidence-buildirlg measures. 
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Military intervention through multinational peace support operations has become increasingly chal-lenging due to the complex environments and the 
many different players that are brought into theatre. 
Whereas the prevailing model represents a major departure 
from the former »buffer-zone« peacekeeping, where warrirlg 
factions were separated by a demarcation zone, nowadays it 
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is quite commonplace for indigenous populations to live in 
close proximity of the intervening military forces and, as 
such, are able to view their behavioral conduct and opera-
tional effectiveness. A common method used by warlords, 
nonstate actors and paramilitary regimes in garnering the 
support of local communities, is to offer security guarantees 
in exchange for their support. As a result, the main task for 
the international community in responding to these con-
flicts involves determining the basis for local support and 
seeking to redirect the population's allegiance towards the 
interventionist forces by demonstrating the provision of 
credible security. This is all the more important as research 
indicates that disparate national approaches observed in re-
cent multinational peace support operations have had a di-
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